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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In August of 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington was again confronted with the issue of treaty-mandated habitat protection.1  This 
case, (the “Culvert Decision”) and the many years of litigation that preceded it, revolved around 
language in the “Stevens Treaties,” in which several Indian tribes (collectively referred to as the 
“Tribes”) were promised that “[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations, [was] further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory.”2   
While the tribes’ right to take fish was judicially recognized in prior litigation, their right to 
ensure that fish were available to take was not definitively recognized.  This decision 
acknowledges that right and mandates that the State of Washington take certain actions to 
prevent destruction of the habitat of the fish.   
 In making its determination, the district court insisted that its action does not impose a 
broad environmental servitude.  It also insisted that its decision does not impose an affirmative 
duty on the state to undergo whatever action is necessary to protect the fish.  However, in 
recognizing that the treaty-based “right to fish” necessarily includes a “right to ensure that fish 
are available to take,” the court is recognizing a right that is reminiscent of a limited 
conservation servitude, or habitat protection easement.  However, instead of defining the scope 
of the servitude at the outset, the court is simply allowing the servitude to take form over time on 
a case-by-case basis.  While this case is promising for Indian tribes and Indian law in general, we 
cannot be sure whether the district court’s rationale will be adopted by other courts.  Moreover, 
the case could still be appealed.   
                                                 
1 United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash.).  The first time this court was faced with this issue 
was in 1980.  See United States v. Washington, 506 F.Supp 187 (1980).   
2 United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 189 (1980). 
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 This comment will analyze the Culvert Decision and the litigation that preceded it in an 
attempt flesh out a framework that would be applicable to other tribes that are trying to protect 
their reserved rights.  Part I gives a brief history of the litigation that preceded the Culvert 
Decision.  Part II examines the Culvert Decision, exploring the Court’s rationale for recognizing 
a right, but not a broad environmental servitude.  Part III discusses a framework for recognizing 
a habitat-conservation servitude.  Part IV provides ideas for giving definition to the habitat 
protection right.   
 
I. BACKGROUND OF LITIGATION PRECEDING THE CULVERT CASE 
 
 The litigation around the Stevens Treaties is extensive.  For longer than a century, courts 
have been called upon to interpret the treaties and flesh out the treaty rights that current Indian 
tribes hold.  One of the most interesting aspects of the treaties and the ensuing litigation is the 
rich history that must be studied in order to understand the treaties from a contextual basis.   
   
A. The Stevens Treaties 
 
 In 1854 and 1855, Isaac Stevens, the first governor of Washington Territory and the first 
Indian superintendent of the Washington Territory,3 negotiated several treaties with tribes 
indigenous to the Pacific Northwest.  Six of these treaties retained fishing rights for the tribes 
with the following words: “[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory.”4  These 
treaties are commonly referred to as the “Stevens Treaties.”    
 Stevens’ goal was fairly simple; as an agent for the United States, Stevens set out to 
obtain as much land as possible from the tribes of the Northwest, expending the least amount of 
                                                 
3 Id. at 191. 
4 Id. at 189. 
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United States resources possible.  By the end of the treaty negotiations, the Tribes ceded an 
estimated sixty-four million acres of land to the United States.5  In return, the Tribes were 
compensated monetarily as well as with supplies such as blankets and blacksmith shops.6   In 
addition to the money and goods that the tribes received in exchange for ceding their title to the 
land, the also Tribes reserved certain rights.7  The right of taking fish in common with non-
Indians at their usual and accustomed grounds is one of the most important rights reserved by the 
tribes; it is also the subject of over a century of litigation.8     
 During the treaty negotiations, both the tribes and Stevens acknowledged the importance 
of fish to the tribes.  In fact, prior to the treaty negotiations, Stevens discussed the necessity of 
preserving the tribes’ fishing rights with his advisors.9   During treaty negotiations, Governor 
Stevens reiterated the intent to preserve the tribes’ fishing rights in the following speech. 
Are you not my children and also children of the Great Father?  What will I not 
do for my children, and what will you not do for yours?  Would you not die for 
them?  This paper is such as a man would give to his children and I will tell you 
why.  This paper gives you a home.  Does a father not give his children a home? 
… This paper secures your fish.  Does not a father give food to his children?10 
 
 As referenced in the treaty negotiations, salmon were an integral part of the lives of 
Indian tribes located in the Pacific Northwest.11  Salmon served not only as a primary food 
source for the Tribes, but also served as the basis of their economic system.12  Moreover, salmon 
were at the center of the tribes’ religion and culture.13  Considering the importance of the salmon 
                                                 
5 Vincent Mulier, Recognizing the Full Scope of the Right to Take Fish Under the Stevens Treaties: The History of 
Fishing Rights Litigation in the Pacific Northwest, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 41, 41 (2006-2007). 
6 O. Yale Lewis, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of the Trinity of Rights Implied by the Fishing 
Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 281, 289 (2002-2003). 
7 Mulier, supra note 5, at 41. 
8 Id. 
9 Lewis, supra note 6, at 288. 
10 United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 192 (1980). 
11 Lewis, supra note 6, at 288.  
12 Lewis, supra note 6, at 288. 
13 Lewis, supra note 6, at 288. 
 6
to the Tribes, it is not surprising that relinquishing their right to the fish was a non-negotiable 
item when entering into treaties with the United States. 
 Nonetheless, the Tribes have not simply enjoyed their reserved right as their ancestors 
probably anticipated when they signed the treaties.  Instead, they have endured years of 
deprivation of their rights.  It has only been through prolonged litigation, that the Tribes’ rights 
are finally being honored, at least to some extent. 
 
B. Judicial Recognition of Treaty-Based Right to Take Fish 
  
 Courts have already recognized two property rights inherent in the “right to take fish.”   
First, courts recognized that the tribes had a property right to access “usual and accustomed” 
fishing grounds.  Second, courts recognized that the tribes had a property right to an allocation of 
the fish population.  The third right, which should also be seen as a property right, is the habitat 
protection right which was litigated in the recent Culvert Decision. 
1. The Access Right 
 
 In 1905, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the right to take fish under the 
Stevens Treaties in United States v. Winans.14  The controversy arose after the Winans brothers 
installed fishwheels at some of the “usual and accustomed” fishing grounds of the Yakima 
Indians; the fishwheels were precluding Yakima access to the fishing grounds.15  The specific 
issue in front of the Court was whether non-Indian property owners could exclude Indians from 
their land, therefore precluding access to “usual and accustomed” fishing grounds.16   The Court 
looked at the context within which the treaties were made.  The Court recognized that the treaties 
did not confer the right to fish upon the Indians; instead, it was a right that they already 
                                                 
14 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
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possessed before the treaties.17  Furthermore, it was a right that the tribes did not relinquish 
during treaty negotiations.   Specifically, the Court noted that: 
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger rights 
possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of 
impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of the 
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New conditions came into existence, 
to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation of them, 
however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away. In other words, the 
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them,-a 
reservation of those not granted.18     
  
 The Court ruled in favor of the Indians and found that the treaty imposed a perpetual 
servitude on land that provided access to the Indians “usual and accustomed” fishing grounds.  
Therefore, the tribes, as the holders of the servitude, could go onto privately held land to exercise 
their treaty fishing rights.19 
2.  The Allocation Right 
  
 More than fifty years after the treaty access right was recognized in Winans, courts were 
faced with a second treaty-right, the issue of allocation.  While Winans held that tribes had a 
right to access fish via privately owned lands, it did not address the issue of how many fish the 
tribes had a right to.  The first courts to address the issue of a treaty-based allocation right, 
recognized the right in broad, vague terms.  For example, in Sohappy v. Smith, the court held that 
the tribes are entitled to a “fair share of the fish.”20  In Puyallup II, the court held that fish must 
be “fairly apportioned” between Indian and non-Indians.21 The decision that defined the 
allocation-right with specificity was the 1974 “Boldt Decision.”22 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 381. 
19 Id. at 381-82 (“the Indians were given a right in the land,-the right of crossing it to the river,-the right to occupy it 
to the extent and for the purpose mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to the treaty. And the right was 
intended to be continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against the state and its grantees.”) 
20 Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 907 (D. Or. 1969). 
21 Dept. of Game of Wash v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973). 
22 United States v. Washington (Phase I), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). 
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   In 1974, Judge Boldt, a federal judge for the Western District of Washington issued an 
opinion that dramatically affected the Indians’ treaty right to take fish.  Commonly referred to as 
the “Boldt Decision,” the opinion was extremely detailed and is considered Phase I of an 
ongoing stream of litigation that has stretched out over a quarter of a century.  In his opinion, 
Judge Boldt interpreted the vague term of “fair apportionment” as the right to 50% of the salmon 
harvest.23   
 Judge Boldt issued his opinion in response to the United States’ request for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief to define the scope of the treaty fishing rights and require the state 
to issue regulations to protect that right.24  The United States raised three issues:  1) allocation of 
the salmon harvest, 2) allocation of hatchery fish, and 3) protection of the habitat of the fish.  
Judge Boldt bifurcated the issues into two phases.25  Phase I considered the allocation of the 
salmon harvest.  Phase II, dealing with the hatchery fish issue and habitat protection were 
reserved for future litigation. 
 During the Phase I litigation, Judge Boldt heard testimony from a total forty-nine 
witnesses, including Indian and non-Indian witnesses.26  In addition, the federal government’s 
anthropologist presented extensive evidence.27  In his analysis of the Phase I allocation issue, 
Judge Boldt relied on two primary factors.  First, he also relied on the plain language of the 
treaties, specifically, the clause that read “in common with;” Judge Boldt interpreted the phrase 
based on the dictionary definitions at the time of the treaties.28   Second, he relied on his 
interpretation of how the Indians would have understood the terms at the time that they entered 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Fay G. Cohen, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTRAVERSY OVER NORWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 10 
(1986).   
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 11. 
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into the treaties.29 Judge Boldt held that the treaty tribes were entitled to 50% of the salmon, 
steelhead, and other fish catch.30  He also defined the breadth of the tribal right.31  “The right 
secured by the treaties to the Plaintiff tribes is not limited as to the time or manner of taking, 
except to the extent necessary to achieve preservation of the resource and to allow non-Indians to 
fish in common with treaty right fisherman outside reservation boundaries.”32        
3.  The Habitat Protection Right 
 
 Judge Boldt did not rule on the issue of whether the tribes have a right to prevent habitat 
degradation.  This issue was addressed in subsequent litigation by Judge Orrick who found that 
the tribes did have an “implied right to environmental protection of the fish habitat” and that the 
“correlative duty imposed on the State (as well as the United States and third parties) is to refrain 
from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that would deprive the tribes of their moderate living 
needs.”33   
 In analyzing the facts of this case, Judge Orrick distinguished the environmental issue 
from the allocation issue that was addressed in Phase I.  The 50/50 allocation between treaty and 
non-treaty fisherman was derived from the express language of the treaty, supplemented with the 
parties’ intentions and surrounding circumstances.34  In contrast, the treaties do not expressly 
mention the environmental issue.35   Consequently, Judge Orrick found that the “right to have the 
                                                 
29 Id. at 11-12. 
30 Id. at 11.  The 50-50 allocation is more complex than it appears on its face.  For example, it requires that the term 
“harvestable fish” is defined.  Harvestable fish does not include certain categories of fish, such as, fish that Indians 
catch on the reservations, fish the Indians catch to fulfill ceremonial or subsistence needs, or catch necessary for 
escapement.  See Cohen at 12.   
31 Id. at 12. 
32 Id. at 12, quoting U.S v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.  at 343. 
33 United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. 187, 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980).  Judge Orrick also considered 
the “hatchery issue” which was raised in Phase I but reserved for judgment in Phase II.   
34 Id. at 194-95. 
35 Id. at 195. 
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fishery habitat protected from man-made despoliation” was “implicitly incorporated in the 
treaties’ fishing clause.”36 
 Judge Orrick went on to list the special canons of construction that must be used when 
analyzing Indian treaties.  “Indian treaties must be interpreted so as to promote their central 
purposes.”37  Treaties must be read “in light of the common notions of the day and the 
assumptions of those who drafted them.”38  “The treaty must … be construed, not according to 
the technical meaning of its words, but in the sense in which they would naturally be understood 
by the Indians.”39   “Any ambiguities must be resolved in the Indians’ favor.”40 
 Judge Orrick’s reasoning was basically that without a habitat right, the overall treaty right 
to take fish would be meaningless and would eventually result in a “right to dip one’s net into the 
water . . . and bring it out empty.”41  His reasoning was based on the trend of continual 
deterioration of fishing production habitat in Washington streams which was leading to a 
significant decline in the salmon population.42  Judge Orrick included the following quotation in 
his opinion: 
A century ago, salmon abounded in the Pacific Northwest.  Almost every 
accessible area, even in the deep interior, nurtured crops of salmon which 
renewed themselves as they had for millennia.  However, in the Twentieth 
Century, the urbanization and intensive settlement of the area, the rapid 
development of water power, lumbering and irrigation and the pollution of the 
watersheds reduced the quality and the amount of accessible spawning grounds.  
These activities also reduced the rearing capacity of the streams.43 
 
                                                 
36 Id. at 203. 
37 Id. at 195 (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
38 Id. at 195, (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). 
39 Id. at 195 (quoting Washington, Phase I, 443 U.S. at 675-76 and Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899). 
40 Id. at 195, (citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) and Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 
620, 631 (1970)). 
41 United States v. Washington (Phase II), 506 F. Supp. at 197. 
42 Id. at 203.  
43 Id. (quoting United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington Department of Fisheries, and Washington 
Department of Game, Joint Statement Regarding the Biology, Status, Management, and Harvest of the Salmon and 
Steelhead Resources of the Puget Sound and Olympic Peninsular Drainage Areas of Western Washington (1973)). 
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 Judge Orrick recognized that Governor Stevens led the Indians to believe that the treaties 
confirmed their right to “continue fishing in perpetuity” and that “the settlers would not qualify, 
restrict, or interfere with their right to take fish.”44  He also pointed out that the “most 
fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of the fish to be 
taken.”45  In order to have fish available to be taken, their habitat must exist.  The fish must have 
access to and from the sea; have an adequate supply of good-quality water; have sufficient gravel 
for spawning and egg incubation; have an ample supply of food; and have shelter.46  The court 
concluded that human activities have seriously degraded the fish habitat by altering these 
conditions.47     
C.  The Ninth Circuit’s Inconclusive Discussion of Whether the Right to Take 
 Fish Includes an Implied Right to Enforce Habitat Protection 
  
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Judge Orrick’s decision.48  The circuit court did 
not agree with Judge Orrick’s decision or reasoning on the environmental issue.  The Court 
determined that the treaties do not “guarantee an adequate supply of fish to meet the Tribes’ 
moderate living needs.”  Nor do they create an absolute right to relief from all State or State-
authorized environmental degradation of the fish habitat that interferes with a tribe’s moderate 
living needs.”49 However, the Ninth Circuit did not conclusively reject the idea of a duty owed to 
the Tribes by the State to protect the salmon habitat or to at least refrain from destroying it.50  
Instead, the court found a reciprocal obligation by both the tribes and the State.  Specifically, the 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Id. (citing United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington Department of Fisheries, and Washington 
Department of Game, Joint Statement Regarding the Biology, Status, Management, and Harvest of the Salmon and 
Steelhead Resources of the Puget Sound and Olympic Peninsular Drainage Areas of Western Washington (1973)). 
47 Id. 
48 United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983). 
49 Id. at 1375. 
50 United States v. Washington, (Culvert Decision) 2007 WL 2437166, at *4;  United States v. Washington, 506 
F.Supp. 187. 
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Court found that “when considering projects that may have a significant environmental impact, 
both the State and the Tribes must take reasonable steps commensurate with the respective 
resources and abilities of each to preserve and enhance the fishery.”51   
 Three years later, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision regarding habitat protection.  En 
banc, the court found that the declaratory judgment on the environmental issue was not 
sufficiently concrete or precise.52  Even though the Ninth Circuit vacated the earlier decision, the 
analysis contained in the decision may still be applicable.  After all, the court vacated the prior 
decision due to lack of sufficient facts.  Therefore, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit’s original 
opinion will continue to have guidance. 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Recognition of a “Mutual Obligation” 
  
 Essentially, the Ninth Circuit recognized an undefined mutual obligation between the 
Tribes and the State regarding environmental protection; however, it disagreed with the scope of 
the right that Judge Orrick found in his decision.  The Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that the 
tribes have any “absolute right to any particular level of fish supply established by the treaty.”53  
However, the Ninth Circuit did not foreclose the idea of an environmental right.   
 The Ninth Circuit framed its interpretation of the environmental right as one that “looks 
toward cooperative stewardship”54 and one that requires the State and the tribes to take 
“reasonable steps” to preserve and enhance the fishery.”55  The Court was careful to point out 
that the obligation extended to State projects and State permits; however, the obligation does not 
extend to private permittees beyond compliance with their permit.56  The Court described its 
                                                 
51 United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d at 1375. 
52 United States v. Washington, (Culvert Decision) 2007 WL 2437166, at *4; United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 
at 1389. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 1381. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at  FN 15. 
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approach as one that is more specific than the “comprehensive environmental servitude” 
established by Judge Orrick.  The Court characterized its interpretation of the treaty as putting 
environmental restraints on activities in the case area, but “channel[ing] the inquiry into adverse 
effects on treaty fish runs in a way that is more reasonable and more equitable to all.”57 
 2.   The Ninth Circuit’s Objections to Judge Orrick’s Proposed Environmental   
      Right 
  
 The Ninth Circuit categorized its objections to the Judge Orrick’s proposed 
environmental right into four main areas.  First, the Ninth Circuit was troubled by a lack of 
precedent for the right.58  Second, the Court felt that there was a lack of theoretical or practical 
necessity for the right.59  Third, the Ninth Circuit described the environmental right as an 
“unworkably complex standard of liability.”60  Fourth, the Court was concerned with the 
potential of “disproportionately disrupting essential economic development.”61   
   a.  Lack of Precedent 
 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Judge Orrick’s application of Fishing Vessel to find 
precedent for an environmental servitude.  This Court applied the holding of Fishing Vessel to 
this case as requiring losses that result from reasonable development to be shouldered equally by 
treaty and non-treaty fisherman.62  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a problem would 
only arise if a pattern of development was harming treaty fish runs without harming non-treaty 
fish runs.63  As long as the destruction to the fish habitat was occurring equally, in a non-
discriminatory fashion, the Tribes could not invoke any right to prevent the destruction. 
  b.  Lack of Theoretical or Practical Necessity  
                                                 
57 Id. at 1381. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1382.   
63 Id. 
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 The Ninth Circuit also felt that an environmental servitude was simply unnecessary.  
First, the Court reasoned that malicious or reckless disregard for the effects that State projects 
would have on the fishery would be barred under the discriminatory regulation standard that was 
set forth in Puyallup if the effects led to a “drastic decline in available fish.”64  Second, the Court 
reasoned that the environmental servitude was unnecessary because it is not in the State’s interest 
to allow for the decline of the fish population.65 
c.  Unworkably Complex Standard of Liability 
   The Ninth Circuit criticized Judge Orrick’s definition of the habitat protection right as 
being “unworkably complex.”66  Specifically, the Court addressed the burden that the tribes 
would have to show that a proposed action would degrade the fish habitat and that the state was 
the proximate cause of such degradation.67  The Court felt that the causal link stemming from 
one state project was just too remote to the possible degradation of the fish habitat since many 
projects could contribute to the degradation.68  In addition to the complications in determining 
the causal chain, the Court felt that the necessity to compute the moderate living standard was 
simply too much of a burden on a court reviewing the matter.69   
d. Potential of Disproportionately Disrupting Essential Economic Development 
   
 The Ninth Circuit was also concerned about the disruption that a conservation servitude 
could have on state activities.  The Court described the state permitting process as one designed 
to balance state interests in environmental protection against state interests in allowing 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1384. 
65 Id.  “Each additional fish the hatcheries produce benefits all fisherman, Indians and non-Indians alike.  Thus, 
unless the State is to abandon the very powerful non-Indian constituency, the prospect of drastic State-caused 
decline in the anadromous fishing runs of the case area is chimerical.”Id. at 1384. 
66 Id. at 1387. 
67 Id. at 1388. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
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development.70  The environmental servitude, the Court explained, would place the highest 
priority on avoiding potential impact to the fisheries that would reduce the tribal members’ 
income.71  Moreover, the environmental servitude would affect all state or state-authorized 
activities affecting the environment.72 
II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE CULVERT DECISION 
 
 In 2001, the United States and several Indian tribes from the Northwest initiated the case 
that resulted in the “Culvert Decision”.  The case was brought in response to the direction of the 
Ninth Circuit to bring forth a sufficient factual basis for confirmation of the Tribes’ treaty-based 
habitat protection right.73  The United States and the Tribes filed a Request for Determination 
against the State of Washington “to enforce a duty upon the State of Washington to refrain from 
conducting and maintaining culverts under State roads that degrade fish habitat so that adult fish 
production is reduced, which in turn reduces the number of fish available for harvest by the 
Tribes.”74 
 The state of Washington constructed culverts rather than bridges in many places where 
roadways cross rivers and streams.75    The State acknowledged that many of the culverts were 
blocked, not allowing the free passage of migrating fish.76  The Tribes alleged that culverts under 
state owned roads were blocking more than 400,000 square meters of productive spawning 
                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Brief for Plaintiffs at 2; United States v. Washington, 2007 WL 2437166 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (No. C70-9213). 
74 Id.  
75 United States v. Washington (Culvert Decision), 2007 WL 2437166 * 3.  A culvert is a tube-like structure that is 
constructed under roadways to divert water and prevent flooding.   The State of Washington conducted studies that 
showed that improperly maintained culverts prevent salmon from accessing productive spawning grounds.  See 
Brian A. Schartz, Fishing for a Rule in the Sea of Standards:  A Theoretical Justification for the Boldt Decision, 15 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 314, note 2;  see also Lewis supra note 6, at 281-82.  
76 Id.  
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habitat and greater than 1.5 million square meters of productive rearing habitat.77  Overall, the 
Tribes stated that the removing the blockages from the culverts would result in an annual 
increase of 200,000 fish.78 
 It this case, the parties conceded that neither the Tribes nor Governor Stevens anticipated 
that there would be a lack of fish.79  Because of the abundance of fish in the region, there was no 
indication that supply would be a problem.  From the Indian perspective, there was no reason to 
believe that the supply of fish would be a problem.  Indian culture was conservationist-minded 
and included protection of the fish runs and streams.80   
 However, the fish supply did decrease, and drastically.  Currently, many populations are 
extinct, in danger of extinction, or at the very least, severely depressed.81  Traditional ceremonies 
often must rely on fish that are bought instead of caught.82  Moreover, fewer young tribal 
members are entering the fishery which is creating a break in the link of passing down of tribal 
customs from one generation to the next.83 
A. The Tribes’ Arguments 
  
 The Tribes sought equitable relief from “state-owned culverts that block hundreds of 
miles of streams capable of producing hundreds of thousands of fish, half of which the tribe 
would have a treaty right to harvest.”84  Specifically, the Tribes sought a “declaration that so long 
as they are not attaining a moderate living from their fisheries, the Treaties prohibit the State 
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80 Brief for Plaintiffs at 4. 
81 Id.  (citing 1997 Washington Fish Passage Task Force Report). 
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83 Brief for Plaintiffs at 5. 
84 Brief for Plaintiffs at 2. 
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from maintaining culverts that restrict salmon access and reduce the numbers of fish available for 
tribal harvest.”85 
 The tribes overarching argument was that the courts had already established that the 
Stevens Treaties do not allow the subject matter of the treaty to be destroyed.86  More 
specifically, the tribes argued that the treaties “reserved to the tribes the right to actually harvest 
fish, free of state interference,”87 arguing that the language of the treaties was that “they would 
share their fisheries with non-Indians, but the treaties would never allow non-Indians to interfere 
with the tribes ability to sustain themselves by fishing.”88  The tribes argued that during the 
negotiation of the treaties, while most tribes were willing to cede most of their land, they were 
not willing to give up their fish since it was the mainstay of their existence.89  
 The tribes presented evidence of the understanding of the Indians and the United States 
during the treaty negotiations.  Governor Stevens understood that fish were essential to the 
Tribes.  The Supreme Court took notice of Stevens’s understanding in Fishing Vessel when it 
stated that “[i]t could never have been the intention of Congress that Indians should be excluded 
from their ancient fisheries.”90  There were a number of reasons that Stevens intended for the 
tribes to continue on as self-sufficient fisherman.  One, allowing the tribes to continue as self-
sufficient communities took the burden of supporting them off of the U.S. Government.  In 
addition, Stevens recognized that the tribes were providing fish for settlers of the region.  
Therefore, Stevens had his own self-motivating interests for agreeing that the tribes would 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Brief for Plaintiffs at 6 (citing United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685(9th Cir. 1975). 
87 Id. 
88 Brief for Plaintiffs at 1. 
89 Brief for Plaintiffs at 3, (citing United States v. Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1437 (W.D. Wash. 1994) 
(“Whatever land concessions they made, the Indians viewed a guarantee of permanent fishing rights as an absolute 
predicate to entering into a treaty.”) 
90 Id.  (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 666 (quoting Stevens)). 
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continue to have the right to take fish which logically included that right to insure that the fish 
were there to take.   
B. The State’s Arguments 
  
 The State of Washington argued that the primary concern of the Tribes was not the 
factual culvert issue, but instead a legal issue of whether the land that the Tribes ceded was 
“burdened by an implied servitude requiring current land owners to avoid impairing the Tribes’ 
ability to earn a ‘moderate living’ from fishing.”91  The State argued that the legal issue failed as 
a matter of law for three reasons.  First, the State argued that the treaty language does not 
expressly provide for an environmental servitude, therefore, one does not exist.92  Second, the 
State argued that the Tribes were attempting to create a new treaty right out of a limitation on an 
equitable remedy.93  Third, the State argued that recognition of an environmental servitude is not 
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision.94   
 The State’s argument regarding the treaty language hinged on the fact that the treaties did 
not expressly provide for an environmental servitude.  The State supported their argument by 
introducing evidence that at the time of the treaty, fish was abundant.95  Therefore, the State 
argued that neither the tribes nor the United States would have had any reason to include 
servitude to protect the fish because there was not indication that they needed to be protected.96  
The State also argued that just because a party inaccurately speculates about future conditions, it 
does not afford the party a remedy.97  The State mentioned the Indian canons of construction, 
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however, it did not apply them to the treaty language; it instead dismissed the canons as only 
applying to explicit language.98  
 The State failed to recognize that the Moderate Living Standard is a standard that was set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court; the State instead interpreted the provision under 
contract law.  The State argued that since the term “Moderate Living Standard” was not in the 
treaties themselves, and that the term is ambiguous, then the term unenforceable.99  The State 
argued that the “Moderate Living Standard” was not a right, but instead, a remedy that the 
Supreme Court used.100    
 Finally, the State argued that the Ninth Circuit en banc decision dictates that the 
Moderate Living Standard fails.  In addition, the State argued that equitable defenses should bar 
the tribes’ claim of an environmental servitude because it would “disrupt the settled expectations 
of current landowners in Western Washington.”101 
 The State argued that the only equitable power that the Court has is to enjoin “imminent 
destruction of the fish or order emergency protective measure.”102  Basically, the State claimed 
that it is only is an “extreme case” that the Court may make such a directive.103  Therefore, the 
State argued that since the condition of the culvert does not constitute an extreme case, the State 
was entitled to summary judgment on the matter.104 
C. The Court’s Analysis and Decision 
 
 The District Court correctly rejected the majority of the State’s arguments.  It rejected the 
argument that the tribes do not hold at least some sort of right to protect habitat; it rejected the 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Brief for Defendants at 15. 
101 Brief for Defendants at 16. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
 20
argument that the Tribes do not have a right regarding habitat degradation; and it rejected the 
argument that the Moderate Living Standard is an inappropriate standard to measure the right by. 
1. The Ninth Circuit did Not Preclude Finding a Treaty-based Habitat Right 
 
 Judge Martinez did not agree with the State’s argument that the habitat right issue was 
already rejected by the Ninth Circuit.  Instead, he reasoned that “the court’s order did not contain 
broad and inclusive language necessary to reject the idea of a treaty-based duty in theory as well 
as practice.  Instead, the Court found that the declaratory judgment on environmental issues was 
imprecise and lacking in a sufficient factual basis.”105  Furthermore, Judge Martinez concluded 
that the court’s language “clearly presumes” that the State has an obligation that would be 
defined by “concrete facts presented in a particular dispute.”106  However, in finding that the 
Tribes had produced sufficient factual information needed for a narrowly-crafted declaratory 
judgment, Judge Martinez distinguished this from a “broad environmental servitude.”107   
2. Tribes Have a Treaty-Based Right to Habitat Protection 
 
 In the Culvert Decision, Judge Martinez recognized that the Indian Canons of 
Construction were the appropriate guidelines for finding a duty on behalf of the State to “refrain 
from blocking fish access to spawning grounds and rearing habitat.”108  He noted that when 
interpreting the treaty, the court must construe the language “in the sense in which” the Indians 
would have understood it, and not by the technical meaning of the words.109  Applying this 
standard, Judge Martinez recognized that the treaties secured the right to take fish in addition to 
the mere right to have access to the fish.110  Judge Martinez relied on the expert opinions that 
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were part of the litigation, including the opinion of a historian111  who testified about the treaty 
negotiations and the focus from both sides on the fish as central to the Tribes’ way of life.112  For 
example, an interpreter during the negotiations reassured the Tribes that they were “not called 
upon to give up their old modes of living as places of seeking food, but only to confine their 
houses to one spot.”113  Judge Martinez also pointed out that it likely just as important for the 
United States that the Tribes’ retained their rights to the fish because it “was necessary for the 
Indians to obtain subsistence,” so that the United States would not incur costs to feed the 
Indians.114  Finally, the negotiators outright promised the tribes that they “shall not have simply 
food and drink now but that you may have them forever.”115 
 Judge Martinez concluded that because the Tribes had received multiple assurances that 
their right to take fish was secure, even after they agreed to give up extraordinary amounts of 
land, that there was an implied promise that the United States would not degrade the fish.116  If 
the assurances were not accompanied by the implied promise, then they were meaningless.117   
3.     The Moderate Living Standard may be an Appropriate Standard by which  
   a Habitat Right is Measured 
 
 Judge Martinez outright rejected the State’s argument that the moderate living standard 
cannot be a measure of a habitat right because the Treaty did not include the term.118   Judge 
Martinez pointed out that the term “moderate living” was developed by the Courts; therefore, 
obviously it was not included in the Stevens Treaties, since it is part of the courts’ interpretation 
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of treaties.119 Judge Martinez further explained that that the court would be responsible for any 
further definition of the term if it was necessary, not the Tribe.120  Furthermore, he was satisfied 
that the moderate living standard had been met by the fact that the tribes showed that fish 
harvests were substantially diminished and that there was a logical inference that a significant 
portion of the diminishment was caused by the blocked culverts.121 
III. ESTABLISHING AND DEFINING THE HABITAT PROTECTION RIGHT 
 
 Although a court could doctrinally find that habitat servitude exists, the Ninth Circuit 
and the District Court in the recent Culvert Decision reject the terminology.  However, both 
courts recognized that the treaties provided the Indian Tribes with some sort of right as to 
protecting the species who were the subject of their reserved rights.  Neither court fully 
addressed the scope of the right; therefore, the actual parameters of that right are yet to be fully 
determined.   
A. Proper Application of the Indian Canons of Treaty Interpretation combined with 
Analysis of Environmental Servitudes Leads to an Implied Habitat Easement  
 
 Treaties with Indian Tribes are not merely contracts between two parties.  Instead, they 
are agreements between sovereigns and are therefore part of the supreme law of the land.122  
Moreover, considering the context within which the treaties were made, mainly the inferior 
position that tribes were put in during the negotiation of the treaties, the Supreme Court set forth 
special canons of construction that courts must use when interpreting treaties with Indians.     
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1. The  Indian Canons of Construction  
 
 It is a well established doctrine that courts must interpret treaties between the United 
States and Indians in light of special canons of construction.123  The Indian Canons of 
Construction provide that courts must, 1) interpret treaties as the Indians understood them; 2) 
interpret treaties in favor of the Indians; and 3) resolve all ambiguities in favor of the Indians.124   
2.  Environmental Servitudes 
 
 One technique that conservationist have started using in earnest over the past twenty 
years is that of placing a conservation easement, also referred to as a conservation servitude, on a 
piece of property.125  The conservation servitude is usually in the form of a negative easement in 
that it prevents the property owner from engaging in certain activities on his land.126  The holder 
of the easement is usually a land trust, a conservation organization, or a state or local 
government.  The easement runs with the land and in most cases, is designed to survive in 
perpetuity.   
 The Third Restatement of Property defines conservation servitude as  
a servitude created for conservation or preservation purposes. Conservation 
purposes include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space value 
of land, assuring the availability of land for agricultural, forest, recreational, or 
open-space use, protecting natural resources, including plant and wildlife habitats 
and ecosystems, and maintaining or enhancing air or water quality or supply.127 
  
                                                 
123 See Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 62 S.Ct. 862, 86 L.Ed. 1115; Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 
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SERVITUDES. 
127 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDE, § 1.6 (emphasis added). 
 24
  The intent of the parties to create a servitude may be either express or implied and “[n]o 
particular form of expression is required.”128  According to the commentary, “[t]o avoid 
unfairness, American courts generally seek to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the 
parties, even though imperfectly expressed.”129  The intent to create a servitude may be inferred 
from the terms or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance of another interest in land.130  
 A servitude may be found based on the inferred intent of the parties to the conveyance.  
“The inference may be based on the language used in the conveyance, the object of the 
transaction, the use of the property made prior to severance, the language used in referring to 
maps or boundaries, or restrictions imposed on the conveyed land.”131   Overall, “the inference is 
based on the conclusion that, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the parties 
intended to create a servitude but failed to give full expression to their intent.”132 
 In situations where there is no basis for concluding that the parties intended to create a 
servitude, for example, if neither party knew a servitude was needed, a servitude may be implied 
on the basis of public policy.133  The underlying policy is to avoid economic waste.134  “Meeting 
the reasonable expectations of landowners and purchasers, and arriving at results that are fair to 
all parties, are very important considerations.”135 
3. Application of the Indian Canons of Construction to the Treaties Could Result in 
finding an Environmental Servitude  
 
 By properly applying the Indian Canons to the Stevens Treaties, considering the law of 
servitudes, a court should find implied habitat conservation servitude.  According to the first 
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canon, courts must interpret the reserved right as the Indians would have understood it.136  
Because the fishing rights were essential to the survival of the tribes, it is unlikely that they 
knowingly gave up the right to ensure that the subject of the right was protected.   Therefore, 
there are essentially two options.  First, the tribes may not have included an explicit right to 
protect the habitat because it did not seem necessary due to the abundance of resource.137  
Alternatively, it is possible that the tribes did not include express language because they felt that 
habitat protection was already implicitly included in the right to take fish. 
 Courts could find that the tribes assumed that their express reserved fishing right 
implicitly included a habitat conservation servitude.  The language of the treaties does not 
expressly state that a habitat conservation servitude was reserved; however, servitudes do not 
need to be express to be enforceable.138  A servitude may be implied and may be inferred from 
the terms or circumstances surrounding a conveyance in land.139   
 When reviewing the circumstances surrounding the treaties and the conveyance of land 
under the treaties, the treaties must be construed as the Indians would have understood them.140  
In the litigation surrounding the Steven’s Treaties, both parties seemed to concede that neither 
party thought that the resources were in any danger of depletion.  There are two ways to construe 
this concession.  First, it could lead to the conclusion that the tribes did not recognize a need to 
reserve a habitat servitude because it was inconceivable that the resource could be depleted.  
Under this scenario, the tribes must have believed that the resources would be replenished 
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infinitely, otherwise their perpetual fishing rights would have been limited.  Therefore, the tribes 
would not have understood that the treaty reserved an implied habitat servitude.     
 An alternate conclusion was that the tribes did not retain an express servitude because 
they understood it to be implicitly included in their express reserved right to fish. Although it is 
unlikely that the Indians involved in the treaty negotiations were familiar with the term 
“servitude,” the concept of conservation was certainly familiar.141  Conservation was, in fact, 
embedded in the culture of the tribes of the Pacific Northwest.142  While it is plausible that the 
non-Indians involved in the treaty negotiations viewed the fish population as perpetual, it is 
likely that the tribal members, on the other hand, didn’t require explicit conservation provisions 
in the treaties because conservation was inherent in their culture.143  There was simply no need to 
spell out preservation or conservation protection. Therefore, it is very possible that the tribes 
assumed that white settlers would live in a fashion that was consonant with conservation 
principles that could be termed as a habitat servitude.  Because conservation was inherent in 
Indian culture, it is conceivable that the tribes assumed that a right to protect the resource that 
was the subject of their reserved usufructuary rights was included in their reserved right.    
                                                 
141 “There is no evidence of the precise understanding the Indians had of any of the specific English terms and 
phrases in the treaty.   It is perfectly clear, however, that the Indians were vitally interested in protecting their right 
to take fish at usual and accustomed places, whether on or off the reservations, and that they were invited by the 
white negotiators to rely and in fact did rely heavily on the good faith of the United States to protect that right.”  
United States v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel,  443 U.S. 658, 666-67 (1979).  
142 There are several examples of tribal customs and activities that demonstrate that conservation was embedded in 
the tribes’ culture and practices.  For example, the tribes prepared the environment for the coming of the annual 
coming of the salmon by ensuring that rivers and streams were free of rubbish and food scraps.  The tribes also 
prohibited the bailment of canoes into the rivers.  Tribal practice also prohibited fisherman from taking more fish 
than they needed and when the fish were running, fishermen would open their nets periodically to let some fish 
escape.  See Cohen, supra note 26, at 24. 
143 Conservation was not a separate concept, but rather one that was embedded in tribal culture.  For example, the 
environmental preparations that were made for the coming of the salmon were accompanied by spiritual rituals as 
well.  Id. 
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 According to the Indian Canons the treaty must be construed in favor of the tribes and 
any ambiguities must be resolved in their favor.144  It is clear that the treaties did not include an 
express provision for a habitat servitude.  However, it is not clear whether the reserved fishing 
right includes an implied habitat servitude.  Therefore, the treaties are at the least ambiguous as 
to whether an implied environmental servitude exists, and any ambiguity must be resolved in the 
favor of the tribe.  Therefore, the Canons on Construction dictate that a habitat servitude is 
recognized; otherwise, the reserved fishing right that was intended to survive perpetuity will be 
rendered useless a mere one hundred and fifty years after its creation.  Less than two centuries is 
hardly equivalent to perpetuity by any stretch of the imagination.145      
 
IV. GIVING FORM TO THE HABITAT PROTECTION RIGHT 
 
 Although Judge Martinez in the Culvert case insisted that he was not creating a “broad 
environmental servitude” as feared by the State of Washington, he did provide relief to the 
plaintiff tribes.  So, what was the right that the Judge was enforcing?  It may not be what the 
court termed a “broad environmental servitude” requiring the State or individual property owners 
to restore the fish habitat to the treaty-time pristine condition; however, the court is recognizing a 
treaty right which is still best recognized as a servitude, or as a negative easement.  However, 
since the courts are reluctant to use the terminology, it may be best referred to as simply a 
“habitat protection right.”  Regardless of the label, the right still needs to be defined.   
                                                 
144 See text accompanying note 124. 
145 It is possible that neither party to the treaties included a habitat servitude because both parties truly believed that 
the resource was infinite, regardless of human action.    In situations where there is no basis for concluding that the 
parties intended to create a servitude, for example, if neither party knew a servitude was needed, a servitude will 
only be found on the basis of public policy.  However, according to the Restatement of Property, the underlying 
policy is to avoid economic waste.  Therefore, while arriving at results that are fair to all parties is an important 
consideration, meeting the reasonable expectations of purchasers and landowners is also a concern which could 
outweigh the expectations of the Indian tribes.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 2.2 
Comment (f).  
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 When the Ninth Circuit refused to grant the tribes relief in 1985, the Court did not 
preclude the idea of a habitat right.146  Instead, the Court refused to define the right without a 
sufficient factual base.147   The Culvert Decision represents the first step in constructing the 
scope of the right.   However, although the Culvert Decision provides that first point on the map 
of what will be the habitat protection right, there are many points left to be addressed.  The most 
obvious parameters that need to be addressed are 1) the geographic scope of the habitat 
conservation servitude, or habitat protection right, and 2) the measurement of the conservation 
servitude, or habitat protection right.  
A. Geographic Scope 
  
 One issue with defining the implied habitat right is determining the geographic bounds of 
the right.   The most logical option is to consider the territory ceded by the individual tribe as the 
geographic boundary.  This option would be consistent with the courts’ analysis of other aspects 
of the treaty rights and consistent with the Indian canons of construction.  It is also consistent 
with the concept of a habitat conservation servitude. 
 Judge Martinez did not specifically discuss the geographic scope of a habitat right in the 
Culvert Decision since he was faced only with the specific issue of state-owned culverts.  
Therefore, what we can take from that case is that there is at least one court that considers state-
owned land is within the geographic scope of a habitat right.148     
 The geographic scope of the habitat protection right should be defined as including the 
entire geographic area that the Indians ceded by treaty.  It is the most logical approach for 
various reasons.  First, the habitat right is not a right that the Indian tribes were given; it was a 
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right that they retained on all of the land they ceded.149  Second, for the habitat right to have real 
meaning it must extend to a large land base and defining the right by land ceded is the most 
logical approach. 
 The treaties did not grant fishing rights to the tribes.  Nor did they grant a habitat 
protection right to the tribes.150  Instead, both rights were right that the tribes held pre-treaty 
negotiations and merely memorialized with the treaties.151   The distinction between a right that 
is granted and a right which is retained, or reserved, is critical.  Before the tribes ceded 
astounding acres of land, they had certain property rights.  When they ceded the land, they gave 
up only those rights that were explicitly set forth in the treaties.  All other rights were retained.  
While the tribes relinquished many rights to the vast acres they ceded, they did not relinquish the 
right to fish at their ordinary and accustomed fishing grounds.  Implicit in that right is the right to 
ensure that fish are available to take.  Therefore, by recognizing a habitat protection right over 
the entire ceded territory, courts will merely honor the agreement between the tribes and the 
United States treaty-makers by recognizing a right that was retained. 
 Defining the habitat protection right as covering the breadth of the ceded territory makes 
sense from a modern-day perspective as well.  An ecosystem is not defined by man-made 
property ownership boundaries.  Instead, an ecosystem spans across vast areas of land and water.  
Therefore, by limiting the habitat right to certain parcels of land defined by ownership, for 
example, if the right were limited only to state action on state land, the right would have little 
significance.   
B. Parameters for Determining which Activities Violate the Habitat Conservation Right 
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 Beyond the geographic scope of the right, there are other parameters that must be 
articulated.  Specifically, the measurement of the habitat conservation servitude or habitat 
protection right must be defined.  One option is to use the moderate living standard to as a 
baseline for measuring the right.  More specifically, tribes would have the right to prevent habitat 
degradation if the population of a certain species was in danger of dropping below the moderate 
living standard.  Another potential option is to use an “unreasonable interference” standard.  
With this more ambiguous standard, the tribe would have the ability to take action if there was 
unreasonable interference with the habitat of the underlying species that are the subject of the 
reserved treaty right.   
 1.   Moderate Living Standard 
 The Moderate Living Standard is a judicial doctrine that the Supreme Court announced in 
1979 in Fishing Vessel.152  In this case, the Court was reviewing the lower court’s allocation of 
fish between Indian and non-Indian fisherman.153  Although the Court agreed with the lower 
court’s allocation of approximately 50% of the fish to the tribes, it qualified that right with the 
Moderate Living Standard.154  The Moderate Living Doctrine provides a second tier cap on the 
maximum amount of fish that the tribes are entitled to.  They are entitled to 50% of the fish, 
unless tribal needs can be met by a lesser amount.  If so, then the tribe is only entitled to that 
lesser amount.155   
 Although the Fishing Vessel court’s definition of “tribal needs” included tribal 
commercial and ceremonial needs in addition to subsistence needs,156 other courts have 
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interpreted the term differently.  In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians (“LCO”), the district court for the western district of Wisconsin went through the 
exercise of calculating the Moderate Living Standard for the tribe.157  In doing to, the court 
determined that the modern equivalent of the Chippewa’s “traditional tribal needs” was that of 
“zero savings.”158  Therefore the Moderate Living Standard was the equivalence of subsistence 
living, but nothing more.  At least one commentator suggests that the application of the Moderate 
Living Standard in this way is creating a doctrine that is inherently unfair to Indians and treaty-
based fishing rights.159   
By equating the moderate living standard with the traditional tribal living 
standard, the court [in LCO] restricted the tribal share to the amount that would 
provide tribal members with a living standard commensurate with that of their 
ancestors.  Ironically,   this may operate as a disincentive to economic growth and 
development by foreclosing the possibility of significant economic success.  
Additionally, by assessing moderate living in terms of monetary income only, the 
[LCO] court failed to consider other factors, such as infant mortality and life 
expectancy rates, which are all appropriate to a moderate living analysis.160 
  
 However, if the doctrine is applied less restrictively and more in line with the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation in Fishing Vessel, it may be a good alternative for defining one of the 
parameters of the habitat protection right.161  A less restrictive approach would not reduce treaty 
share below the level that is required to fulfill a tribe’s subsistence, ceremonial, and commercial 
needs.162 
 2.  Unreasonable Interference 
 Another option is to define the right using an unreasonable interference standard.  This 
standard has been applied to servitudes.  For example, the Restatement of Property allows a 
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property owner to use the property as she wishes as long as it does not unreasonably interfere 
with the “enjoyment of the servitude.”163 In addition, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the need for a 
“reasonableness” factor in assessing the obligation that the state would have to protecting the fish 
habitat.164   
  The inherent complication with defining a habitat right by an “unreasonable 
interference” standard is the vagueness of the term.  The vagueness would leave courts free to 
interpret the parameters of reasonable on a case by case basis. Currently, this would not provide 
any certainty to tribes or to states as to which actions will be considered reasonable.  However, 
the flexibility that future courts would enjoy due to the vague standard may be the precise reason 
why the Ninth Circuit favored such an approach.   
C. Potential Challenges in Defining the Scope of the Habitat Conservation Right 
 
1. Intrusion on States’ Activities 
 
 One potential challenge in recognizing and defining a habitat easement is the potential 
intrusion on state activities.  For example, in the Culvert Case, the State argued vehemently 
against the recognition of any environmental servitude fearing that it would put upon the State 
the duty to restore habitat back to treaty-time pristine conditions.  Doctrinally, there is an 
argument that tribes do have a right to have the land restored back to the condition it was in at 
the time of the treaty.  However, that is not the only circumstance in which a habitat easement 
can be defined.  Indeed, if the Moderate Living Standard is used to define the easement, the duty 
to restore land to the nineteenth century condition is not relevant. 
 In addition, there is debate over whether a duty to “refrain from degrading or authorizing 
others to degrade” the habitat of the subject of a usufructuary right would represent and 
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extraordinary limitation on state authority.165  However, “[r]elations between Indians and the 
federal government have always been the exclusive domain of the federal government – the 
states are excluded, unless Congress acts to include them.”166 
 Furthermore, although states may fear that recognition of a habitat right, or easement, my 
unduly burden state autonomy, states must remember that treaties are the supreme law of the 
land.  The State of Washington is bound to carry out the terms of the treaties under the 
Supremacy Clause, which imposes an obligation on the state to carry out the provisions of the 
treaties.167  Moreover, there are many things that may tread on state autonomy.  For example, 
states are bound to enforce various federal environmental laws.  While states may fear that the 
implementation burdens the state, they still must enforce the laws.   
2.  Public Policy Considerations with Respect to Individual Landowners 
 
 Another concern with imposing an environmental easement on the property that was 
ceded by the treaties is that private landowners may be unexpectedly disadvantaged by the 
obligations of the easement.  This is a valid concern.  However, the fact remains that the 
agreements between the United States government and the Indian tribes existed long before the 
current property owners took title to their property.  Moreover, the recognition of a habitat 
easement does not mandate that draconian results will occur.  Landowners will not lose 
ownership of their land and in many cases will not be affected by the easement at all.  
 In addition, even if recognition of an easement did result in unexpected disadvantage for 
landowners that reason alone should not preclude a court from recognizing the treaty right.  After 
all, this would not be the first time that a court has recognized an easement on a parcel of land 
that was individually owned and where the owner had no prior knowledge of the easement.  In 
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1884, a private landowner, Frank Talyor, was involved in a suit brought by members of the 
Yakima Nation.168  The Yakima members were litigating their right to enter onto private land to 
litigate their treaty-based right to take fish at their accustomed fishing sites.169  The court found 
that the Yakima members did indeed have a right to enter onto private property to exercise that 
right.170  Moreover, the court implied that there was servitude on the land which would not have 
been extinguished by the Homestead Act.171  Without doubt, this holding resulted in unexpected 
disadvantage to the landowners.172  However, it also upheld the treaty that the United States had 
made with the Yakima Nation. 
 The United States Supreme Court also recognized a servitude where one had not been 
recognized previously.  In Winans, the issue was whether members Yakima could enjoin non-
Indian use of fishing wheels that prevented the Yakima from fishing at their customary sites by 
monopolizing the entire river.173  The Court discussed the treaty-based fishing rights and 
distinguished between rights that are granted and rights that are reserved.174  The fishing rights 
were rights that the tribes had at the time that they entered into the treaties; they were not rights 
that were granted to the tribes by the treaties.175  Therefore, the Court recognized that the tribes 
had reserved a property right.176   
They reserved rights, however, to every individual Indian, as 
though named therein.  They imposed a servitude on every piece of 
land as though described therein . . . The contingency of future 
ownership of lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for; in 
other words, the Indians were given a right in the land, - the right 
                                                 
168 United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333 (Wash. 1887). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See Mulier, supra note 5, at 46 “From the standpoint of the non-Indian property owners . . . the outcome of [this 
case] must have been startling.” 
173 United States v. Winans, supra note 14; see also Mulier, supra note 5. 
174 Id. at 664. 
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
 35
of crossing it to the river, - the right to occupy it to the extent and 
for the purpose mentioned.  No other conclusion would give effect 
to the treaty.177 
 
 Without a doubt, the Supreme Court’s holding in Winans resulted in unexpected 
disadvantage to landowners; however, the holding was necessary to uphold the treaty that the 
Yakima had made with the United States. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The “right to take fish” under the Steven’s Treaties has been a heavily litigated for over a 
century.  During that time, courts have given definition to the right in the form of a right to 
access certain lands in perpetuity, a right to take a certain allocation of fish, and an undefined 
right to enforce protection of the habitat of the fish.  This latest right, the right to enforce 
protection of the habitat of the fish, is still in its infancy and will certainly develop over time.  
Currently, courts reject the notion that the treaties impose a “broad environmental servitude.”  
However, courts agree that the treaties memorialized some sort of habitat protection right.  That 
right is best characterized as a limited habitat conservation servitude, defined by the moderate 
living standard and extending over all lands that were ceded by the treaty.   
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